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J;P.IFF t lF I>EFE:\IL\:\TS-RE~J>< >:\DE~TS 
~IETIU: n. ~T1n·H:-; and .J.\ChlE STRFHS 
:--T.\TE:\lI·:vr <lF THI·: :\.-\Tl"RE OF THE C.-\SE 
l'laintiff~-.\ppt·llant~. a~ 11\\·1wr;:o; of a tract of 
l
1 11d adJ11i11in.l2. land o\\'Jh'd by 1lt·frndant:.H't>spon-
il111h in l\ill.1·1111 :-lubdi,·i~iun, Ellligration Canyon, 
":lit Lak1' C11u11t.1·, l "tah, ~uught in tlw Court lwlow 
l11 1·n,1 11 i11 th1· 1·1·t·eti1111 and 111aintt•11anet• by defrnd-
:lnt-H·~11111lll111t~ 11f a bt1urnlary f1·11ct• bdwt•t•n tlwir 
:i".:IJ11·ti\1· Jir11p1·ni1·:--., clai111ing it intt'rft1 lTt>d with 
:i l111 >1 rip1i11 l'i1.dn 11!' plai11tiff:-;-appt·llants to use 
:i 1L·i 1 "11 ·1· · I f' l I I I · • .1 1111 1 1· 1·rn a11t:-;-n·~1)(1111 1·nts ant a:-; a 
1,:1·111.; i'. I l l · · ·.. JI · " .11·1":--' 111 t 1t· :m1 1if pla111tJ!b-appt• ant~. 
Hereafter, in this brief, the parties will be referrer! 
to as in the Court below. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN 
LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Honorable A. H. El-
lett, judge, sitting without a jury. The Comt de-
nied the relief sought by plaintiffs, rlismissecl !Jlaii:-
tiffs' complaint with prejudice, dismissed the ems~ 
claims against the Third Party defendants with 
prejudice, and quieted title of the defendants against 
the claims of the plaintiffs to the property described 
in the defendants counterclaim and permanently 
restrained plaintiffs from interference with the sairl 
property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek the affirmance of the judg-
ment of the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants find the Statement of Facts as set 
forth in the Plaintiffs' brief, argumentative rather 
than an orderly presentation of proYe<l or admitted 
facts. For this reason defendants elect to make their 
own statement of facts. 
Defendants acquired from Leslie C. Gold and 
Floris C. Gold, his wife, by warranty deed elated 
September 12, 1960 the following describN1 pro· 
perty: 
The upper or north half of Lot 81, and the 
lower or southerly half of the lower or south-
2 
el'ly lialf of Lot 33, Block 2, Killyon Subdi-
1·isio11, Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. (R.11) 
Gold and his wife had acquired the described 
property from William F. Salt and Della Jo Salt, 
his wife, by wananty deed elated the 8th day of 
.June 1960. ( R. 11) 
Salt ancl his wife in turn acquired the described 
property by warranty deed from Clara M. Whipple 
on the 29th day of May 1956. (R 12) In none 
of these deeds was there any reference to any right 
of way 01· easement to which the property was sub-
jPct. ( R. 12) 
The tract of land next adjoining that of de-
fendants on the north is owned by the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff Zella Harries owns an undivided one-fourth 
interest in the property, plaintiff Elmer J. Richins 
owns an undivided one half interest as a joint ten-
ant with his wife, Blanche Richins, who is also the 
owner of the remaining interest in her own right. 
(R-51 Ex P-2, P-3) The legal description of the 
Jll'Operty owned by plaintiffs is, 
The lower half of the upper half and the up-
p~r half of the lower half of Lot 33, Block 2, 
K1llyon Subdivision, Emigration Canyon, Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (R-51 - Ex. P-2, P-3) 
!hl' property now owned by plaintiffs was acquired 
by Leo A. Jones from the Emigration Canyon Im-
pi·m·ernent Company by deed dated July 10, 1912. 
(R 8:3, P-7) Leo A. Jones remained the owner of 
3 
the said tract until February 18th, 1952 when hr· 
gave the property to his four daughters, Zella Fa;, 
Harries, Blanche Evelyn Richins, Mary Maxint 
Clark and Bonnie Joyce Graves. (R-50 Ex. P. 2l 
In none of the deeds affecting conveyance of th~ 
Jones Title was there any mention 01· reservation of 
the right of way or easement involved in this liti-
gation. (R. 51 Ex. P. 2 & 3) John ·w. Whipple, 
husband of Clara M. Whipple, acquired the a<ljoin-
ing tract of land also from Emigration Canyon Im-
provement Co. in 1912, and built a cabin on the 
tract the year following. ( R. 83) Leo A. Jones was 
married to the sister of John "\V. \~lhipple. (R-5G, 
83, 97) The two families were on good terms and 
neighborly with each other. (R. 94, 107) Up until 
1918 the canyon property was reached by the Jones 
and Whipple families respectively by taking the 
street car or train up Emigration Canyon and then 
walking to the property from the nearest stop. 
( R-97, 99, 100) They crossed the creek to their re-
spective properties over small footbridges, one of 
which served the Whipple property and one of which 
served the Jones property. ( R-100) The railroad 
ceased to run in about 1918. (R-134) Mr. Whipple 
acquired a car and he and his sons built a bridge 
of railroad ties across the creek so that they could 
drive from the road across the creek onto their pro-
perty. (R-100) The details of the construction. of 
the bridge and the location thereof with relatwn 
to property lines are obscured by the passage of 
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niiic· ;:nd tlw failing memories of the participants. 
Jfr .J(J 11 es t1·stified that his small son helped bring 
dmrn tht: railrnad ties used to build the bridge. 
( R-84, 86 J l\hs. \Yhipple denied that Mr. Jones or 
his sun participated. (R-100) One of the Whipple 
chilclren, Mrs. Pettit, remembered the building of 
the bnrlge as rather a family project with all of 
rl!r 1mcles and nephews joining in. ( R-135) On one 
point en,ryone was in agreement, that there was no 
rliscussion of whose property the tie bridge was 
Iocatecl on (R-121) and that it was built to serve 
the Whipples who owned a car. (R-87, 93, 107, 113) 
In fact Mrs. \Vhipple said that she never even 
thought about the boundary at the time that the 
bridge was built or thereafter. (R-114) Mr. Jones 
admitted that he did not own a car when the bridge 
was built but rode up the canyon with his brother-
in-law, Mr. \Vhipple, for more than two years after 
the bridge was built before he acquired a car. ( R-93, 
114) and that there was never any issue over the 
drireway or bridge (R-94) between Jones and 
Whipple. As originally drawn the complaint set out 
a c:laim on behalf of the plaintiffs based on an actual 
ownership of part of the land involved in the drive-
way. ( R-2, P. V) This was abandoned at pre-trial, 
howt-wr. (R-19) The original driveway was only 
:he width of a railroad tie. (R-91, 103, 136) The 
present driveway is at least, even by the estimate 
uf M1·. Richins, the plaintiff, some 4 to 5 feet wider 
than the orig-inal driveway. (R-157) The change in 
the driveway came about somewhere bet\\ et'll 19:3~ 
and 1937 and resulted from the fad that tht (·omit·· 
changed the main road up Emigration Canyon. (R-
56, 73, 87) At the time that the change was mad~ 
by the county, and the new culvert put owr the 
stream, the north end, that is the end of the cuh'f'l't 
adjacent to the property of the plaintiffs, was placed 
in the same position as the old bridge (Jf railrnad 
ties as is shown by a clump of birches which it was 
admitted stood at the encl of the original tie bride:e 
and still stands today at the encl of thl' cuhwt 
placed by the county. (R-88, 137, 139, UO, 157, 158, 
159) The additional width, therefon>, \ms gained 
by encroaching further upon the property now own-
ed by the defendants Struhs. (R-140) The changP in ! 
the county mad up Emigration Canyon resulted in 
the abolition of the parking area east of the creek 
which had theretofore been used by the Jones family, 
predecessors in interest to the plaintiffs. (R-160. 
7 4, 75) 
From time to time in the inte1Tening year,, 
the Whipples had built up the earth fill across the 
culvert. ( R-125) After Mr. Struhs acquired the 
property, he rocked up the end of the culvert and 
filled it in an additional 28 to 30 inches onto his 
property. (R-149) From the edge of the culvert •. a~ 
1 
it is now placed on the north side next to the plarn-
tiffs, to the point at which Mr. Struhs placed the 
fence which created the controversy is some 51 inches .. 
( R. 14 7) The length of a railroad tie, a fad nt 
6 
\\'liirli tli1· lo\'.·vr Comt took judicial notice, is only 
6 feet. ( l~-::o, F-U) Exhibit D-11 shows that from 
the t>dge of thl'. l'.uh'ert to the edge of the traveled 
:·urfae,• 1Jf the drinway which lies, according to the 
smwy (Ex. D-11), enti1·ely on the land owned by 
Struhs, is a distance of 48 inches or 4 feet. Thus, 
Mr. Strnhs p!al'.ecl the fence 3 inches inside of his 
11\in pr11perty line as established by the survey. (R-
117 & Ex. D-11) and the entire t1·avelled portion 
rJf the rlriwway even uncle1· the testimony of Mr. 
Junes lirs entire!~· on defendants' ground. (R-147, 
Ex. D-11 l 
In April, 1932, a landslide occurred which de-
molished the Leo Jones house. The landslide also 
co111pletely filled the parking area used by Jones so 
that parking of cars on the land owned by Jones 
wac; rendered \'irutally impossible. ( R-60, 70, 106, 
108, 12~, l:io, 115) This condition existed until 
after Mr. Struhs bought the property. ( R-145) Some 
time in the interwning years, afte1· the property 
claimed by plaintiffs was gi\·en by Leo Jones to his 
daughters, a cabin of sorts was reconstructed on 
the Jn1ws' property. ( R-60, 71) 
Richins, in·esent plaintiff and husband of 
Blanche H ich ins, acquired no actual interest in this 
propr.l'ly ill his own right until April, 1957. ( R-29, 
Finding No. 4) It is freely admitted by Leo A. 
Jones and h:v Mrs. \\'hippie, the respective owners 
of thl' adjoinin.e: tral'ts now claimed by plaintiffs 
:'riil rid'1·nda11ts l'l'SlH'cti\·eI~·. that there was never 
7 
any question i·aisecl of the location of tht, li11unclan 
line between their respectin' in·operfo,:--; or uf 111'
1
• 
use of the drfreway during their i·espt'ctin, owim. 
ships. (R-94, 107, 114) Mrs. \Yhippk· inc1i<"ated that 
she thought that the bouncla1·y line \Yas marked bi· 
an iron stake which stood in the ground for man~· , 
years immediately to the north side of the old ti~ 
bridge over the c1·eek and which was still thf:'re fur 
some years afte1· the new cuh'ert was pla<"Pd. (R· 
101) Mrs. \Vhipple indicated that she had nern·, 1 
until the day of the trial, heard that the bounclan 
line was marked by a tree next to the comer of 
the \Vhipple home. ( R-103) From J 9;)2, when the 
landslide occurred and the Jones' house was clt:struy-
ed, until 1961 or 1962 the1·e was new1· any clear-tut 
evidence of use of the driveway by the plaintiff 
Richins or his wife and no claim was e\·er asserted 
or testimony offered of any use by plaintiff Zella 
Harries. The plaintiff claimed to have maue an 
occasional use after the landslide but no effort was 
made to prove the extent thereof. ( R-70, 71) 
\Vhen Struhs began to use his house the year 
round and desired to fence his land was the first 
occasion that it became manifest and clear that 
anyone on the plaintiffs' side claimed the right to 
use the driveway other than pe1·missively. (R-148) 
There had been one or two incidents immediately 
prior to this time when Richins had requested Struhs 
to remove his car parked in the driveway, but these 
incidents were very shortly prior to putting up the 
8 
fr•Jl('t' 1 H-(iO, fi 1) an cl occurred after Sti·uhs bought 
the vrnpel't>'- Defendants, in the interest of neigh-
borlin1-·ss ~mc1 good will, despite the contention that 
the plaintiffs had no right whatever to use the clrive-
\raY made a formal offer th1·ough the court to put 
a r~1,l\'el't across the creek and put in a clriYeway at 
defendants' expense on plaintiffs' land so that Rich-
ins could reach his property from the road without 
tn11 ersing ~m:v portion of the defendants' land. ( R-
19, 20) This offer was rejected by Richins as is 
shown by thr record. ( R-28) 
ARGUMENT 
POI:\T I. 
TIIE DHI\'E\V AY, WHICH PLAINTIFFS CON-
TE~D THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO USE, WAS NOT A 
.JOI.NT OR COMMON DRI\"EWAY INTENTIONALLY 
LAID OUT AND CONSTRUCTED ON PROPERTY 
0\\'.\'ED BY THE PREDECESSORS OF PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANTS, BUT WAS BUILT ON THE PRO-
PERTY OF THE DEFENDANTS' PREDECESSOR IN 
TITLE, \\'llIPI'LE, FOR HIS O\YN USE AND AS IT 
:STANDS TODAY IN\"OL\"ES ~O PROPERTY OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS . .JOINT DRI\"EWAY CASES ARE NOT 
APPLICABLE PRF:CEDENT UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
The plaintiffs sought originally in the com-
mencrment of this action to base their claim of 
tight to utilize the driYeway in question on the 
theory of the const1·uction of a joint, common drive-
way utilizing property donated by plaintiffs' and 
'.lefenclants' predecessors in title respectively, utiliz-
mg a11 t·qual portion of the prnperty of each. (R-2. 
9 
P. III) This claim was abandoned at thr pre-tl'ial 
and the plaintiffs chose to rely solely upon a clain
1 
of a prescripti,-e right acquired by aclnrse posses-
sion or adverse use. ( R-19) Plaintiffs nevertheless 
persisted throughout the trial, in the argument b~­
fore the lower Court and in the presentation to 
this Court, place emphasis on the purported l'.ontri-
bution by plaintiffs to the creation of the driveway. 
The trial court permitted introduction of such cYi-
dence and the record is replete with the efforts 
by the plaintiffs to establish the fact that the bound-
ary line between the respective properties lay some-
where in the driveway. Mr. Richins, whose testi-
mony was characterized throughout the trial by an 
amazing lack of candor and frankness, attem1Jtecl 
to claim that the boundary line lay in the rnicldl~ 
of the driveway. (R-157) Mr. Richins, likewise, 
attempted to claim that there was a clearly de-
marked boundary by trees which was recognized 
by both parties. ( R-67, 68) This was denied by Mrs. 
Whipple and by all of the witnesses of the defend-
ant. (R-103, 119, 120, 128, 129, 142) The effort by 
Richins to lift himself by his own boot straps in 
attempting to establish a recognized and established 
boundary line between the respective properties fa-
vorable to his contention is reminiscent of the situ-
ation depicted in the musical comedy "Guys an(I 
Dolls" where Big Julie, a gambler from Chicago. 
suffering serious losses, compelled the otht:>r garnhl-
ers to play a round with his dice from which he 
10 
ltacl J't:JJ1(1\ ed the spots but remembe1·ed where they 
nsr:d to lw. Mr. l(ichins, without the benefit of any 
other than his 1JWn testimony not even supported 
by his father-in-law, Mr. Jones, tried to establish 
u;1ilatcrally, a bounclal'y line between these proper-
ties. He dcridecl the sm-Yey 'vhich the defendants 
had c:n1scd to hr made, Exhibit D-11, (R-63) but 
rhong·h tht' plaintiffs had the bunlen of proof to 
sustain tl1is point, pl'Oduced no tangible evidence 
of the lr1cation of the boundary. Plaintiffs relied 
solely on the testimony of Richins himself whose 
bias is manifest from the mere i·eading of the Tran-
script of Testimony. 
Pnclr:· the pl'Oof offered in the instant case, 
the plaintiffs cannot sustain a right based upon 
ownel'ship of any portion of the driveway, for as 
it is presently placed, the traveled surface of the 
drireway is at least 2 feet south of the point at 
which Leu A . .Jones testified he believed the boun-
dary line to be at the time the original tie bridge 
was eonstructecl. ( R-91, 138, 157, 158) Even Mr. 
Richins admitted that the clump of birches stand-
ing at the north encl of the bridge 01· culvert was 
there in the same relative position at the time that 
the tie bridgi.· existed. (R-157, 158) This being 
true, and it being shown that the north end of the 
culrert is now 51 inches north of the disputed fence 
I' 
ilne, and -18 inches north of the traveled surface of 
d11 ' clrireway, there can be no claim made that the 
Y•·::e·11t drin'\\'ay, e\ren nndei· the most favorable 
11 
view of the plaintiffs' evidence, is upon lancl uwnecl 
by the plaintiffs. Mr. Richins, while adn1itting tht 
extension of the width of the bridge arnl of the 
driveway, refused to admit that the boundal'y line 
did not move as the driveway was extended. His 
testimony on this point was evasive in the extrel!l~. 
He placed the boundary line, conveniently in the 
middle of the d1·iveway (R-157) though Ml'. Jones. 
owner at the time the tie bridge was built and plain· 
tiffs' predecessor in title, admitted that no rnm·p 
than one third of the land in the original driveway 
was his at any time and prnbably not mul'e than 
two feet. (R-91) Mr. Richins, while admitting that 
the driveway had increased in width some four to 
five feet, ( R-157) and admitting that the encl of 
the culvert placed by the county to replace the tie 
bridge, was, in so far as its position on his side 
in the same place as the tie bridge by referral to 
the clump of birch which remained constant in its 
position throughout the period, (R-157, 158) hP 
nevertheless claimed that the boundary line still 
lay in the middle of the widened driveway. (-157) 
This is, of course, a mechanical impossibility. 
Mr. Richins lack of truthfulness in his testi-
mony is well illustrated in his exchange with the 
Judge regarding the number of cars which could 
be parked on his side of the driveway. 
"Q. The area that would be west of the 
creek, how many cars could _YOU pal'k on Y~~ 
area that is north of the driveway and we, 
of the stream? 
12 
A. \Vell, if you want to ask that ques-
tion, r could tell you quite a few. 
Q. THE COURT: He's already asked 
the question. Just answer it. 
A. Twenty-five, but you can say it is 
wrong, see. It all depends. 
THE COURT: \Vell, if you want me to 
say it is wrnng, just-. 
A. You can put ten. 
THE COURT: I want you to answer his 
question, and I want you to answer it truth-
fully. I don't care what he says about it. I 
want you to tell me the truth. If you don't 
intend to tell me the truth, get off the stand. 
No nerd of my listening to you if it is not 
true. 
A. I never did measure. 
MR. BLACK: I wonder if counsel would 
clarify the question. 
THE COURT: It is clear enough. He just 
asked how many cars could he park on their 
property west of the stream. He says he could 
tell us twenty-five, but he wouldn't believe it. 
I don't like that kind of answer. It is taking 
my time fo1· nothing. 
A. \Vell, I will say you can put twelve 
cal'S in there if you pa1·kec1 them right. 
Q. Sir, now, this is in 1932 before the 
change of the road? 
MR. BLACK: No, I believe -
A. You had it the other way. 
MR. BLACK: I believe that that question 
was grared to after the culvert was -
1" 0 
THE COURT: Let the witness tell wh;it 
the facts are. I thought it was befort> the roar! 
was changed when you were parking but if 
it isn't - ' 
MR. BLACK: Well, he said -
THE COURT: Let's find out both wavs. 
The1·e are no secrets. How many cars coiilrl 
you park on your lot, the one you now own, 
west of the stream before the mad was ehang--
ed? 
A. Before the road was changed? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
A. \Vell, I wouldn't estimate H. 
MR. BLACK: Well give us an estimate. 
A. Well, I would say 'four. 
THE COURT: Four? 
A. And I could say ten. 
MR. BLACK: Well give us your best -
THE COURT: You don't need to bother 
him. Go ahead Mr. Tibbals." (R-31, 32) 
Mr. Jones, the owne1· of the land now claimed 
by plaintiffs at the time that the original tie bridge 
was put in across the c1·eek, made no claim that he 
had participated in the creation of the bridge or 
the driveway, and made no claim that the same hall 
been intentionally laid out by the adjoining owners 
to utilize portions of their respective properties in 
the driveway. (R-87, 91) Mr. Jones only claim to 
any participation in the original creation of the 
bridge was that his son, who was then about eight 
years of age, (R. 143) helped Mr. ·Whipple. de-
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£e11dant's prccleeessor in title bring down some of 
the ties that were used in making the bridge. (R-
91, 86) 
This is a fa1· cry from the situation which is 
recognized as creating a common right of way or 
driveway to which neither party may deny access 
to the other. Corpus Jm·is Secundum Vol. 28 on 
EASEMENTS at page 673 Sec. 18j as quoted by 
;ippellants' brief outlines the conditions essential to 
the creation of this kind of an easement or right 
11f way as follO\vs: 
"The mutual use by adjoining landowners of 
a way laid out between their lands, each de-
voting a part of his land to the purpose, will 
generally be considered adverse to a separate 
and exclusive use of the way be either owner. 
As stated in Corpus Juris, which has been 
cited and quoted with approval, while there 
are some decisions to the contrary, the weight 
of authority is to the effect that, where ad-
joining proprietors lay out a way or alley 
between their lands, each devoting a part of 
~1is land to that purpose, and the way or alley 
is us~cl for the p1·escriptive period by the re-
spective owners or their successors in title, 
~1either can obsb'uct or close the part which 
is on his own land; and in these circumstances 
the mutual use of the whole of the way or 
alley will be considered adverse to a separate 
and exclusive use by either party." 
Appellants' problem is that the facts in this case 
do not support the application of this doctrine as 
to the eaRe before the court. Plaintiff's predecessor 
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in title, Jones, made no claim that hr had particip- ' 
ated in the laying out of the driveway. He admitted 
he had no car at the time it was established or for 1 
at least 2 years thereafter. He admitted that Whip- , 
ple did the work. He claimed his eight year old 
1 
son had helped carry some of the railroad ties but 
no proof was offered by plaintiffs that Jones and 
Whipple ever mutually laid out the driveway as a 
joint driveway. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM TO A PRESCRIPTIVE 
RIGHT TO USE THE DRIVEWAY IN QUESTION IM-
POSES UPON PLAINTIFFS THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
OF SUCH RIGHT. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SUSTAIN 
THIS BURDEN. DEFENDANTS' TITLE TO THE AREA 
IN QUESTION WAS THEREFORE RIGHTFULLY 
QUIETED BY THE COURT BELOW AS AGAINST THE 
CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs presentation of this case on appeal 
is based on the assumption that the defendants have 
the burden of showing that the plaintiffs did not 
acquire a prescriptive right to the use of the drive-
way in question. (Appellants Brief p. 10) In so 
arguing, plaintiffs have lost sight of the fact that 
the burden in the first instance is theirs. This Court 
has spoken clearly and unequivocally on this point: 
"Furthermore, since the clef end ants . cl~illl 
the right to use the driveway by prescnption. 
they have the burden of establishing such 
claim bv clea1· and convincing evidence . .Jeni 
sen v. VGerrard, Supra; 2 Tiffany on Rea 
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Prop(·rty 2d Ed. Sec. 519. P. 2046." Buckley 
\·. Cox 122 LT. 151 247 P2d 277. 
ln aid of their position, the plaintiffs have re-
lied on a presumption of adverse use to show that 
their usr of the dri\·eway in question by themselves 
and their predecessorn in interest was hostile and 
adverse to the defendants. It was shown that the 
Llriyeway had been used by plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in title fo1· more than the prescriptive 
period of twenty years recognized in this state as 
essential to establishment of a prescriptive right. 
Plaintiffs attempt to rely on the theory of joint 
driveway as a means of creating a presump-
tion of adverse use in plaintiffs' favor fails for the 
reasons argued in Point No. I of this brief. There 
simply was never creation of a joint driveway. 
There is not one word of dispute in the record but 
that defendants' predecessor in title John Whipple 
created the driveway in question for his own use. 
The mere fact that the eight yea1· old son of the 
brother-in-law of Whipple, Jones, helped his uncle 
when his uncle built the tie bridge by carrying ties, 
does not make this a joint or common driveway. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on a presumption of adversity 
is mistaken unde1· the facts of this case. 
The law in the State of Utah is clear and un-
ambiguous on the matter of what is required to 
e~tablish a claim of prescriptive right to use of a 
nght of way. The position of this Court has been 
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consistent down through the yeal'S as is shown br 
the following cases. · 
The case of Harkness v. vVoodmcurnee, 7 Utah 
229, 26 P. 292 states, 
"The right to a public road or in·i\'atl: 
way by prescription arises from the uninter-
rupted adverse enjoyment of it under a claim 
of right known to the owner for the requisite 
length of time. Anciently the i·ight to the ease-
ment arose by prescription from the use nf 
the land for so long a time that there was no 
existing evidence as to when such use com-
menced. Its origin must have been at a time 
'whereof the memory of man runneth not to 
the contrary.' Later the rule was changed by 
limiting the time of uninterrupted possession 
to 20 years." 
This rule was cited favorably and enlarged upon 
and interpreted in the case of Morris v. Blwd, 40 
Utah 243, 161 P. 1127. This case held, 
"Under the well-established rule, the use, 
in order that it may ripen into a prescriptive 
title, must, in any case, not only be adverse 
and continuous, and under claim of right for 
a period of twenty years, but it must be un-
interrupted throughout that period. . · ·" 
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 
39 P.2d 1070, the court there stated, quoting from 
page 1072 of the Pacific Report, 
"Since the defendants claimed the right 
to use the roadway by prescription, the b_urrl~1:. 
was upon them to establish such claim 1. 
clear and satisfactory evidence. 2 Tiffany i;n 
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Heal Propertv ( 2cl Ed.) Sec. 519, p. 2046; 
10 C.J. 958, Sec. 181; 1 Jones' Comm. on Evid. 
522. Before a right of way can be acquired 
by prescription, the use for th~ prescriptive 
period must be peaceable, contmuous, open, 
adverse as of right, and with the knowledge 
and acquiescence of the plaintiff and his 
grantors and predecessors in interest. Actual 
notice to the owner of the servient estate is 
not necessary if the user is so notorious that 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence the 
owne1· should learn thereof; then he will have 
constructive notice of the user which is suffi-
cient. Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah, 74, 287 P. 622; 
Bolton \'. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591, 127 P. 355; 
Crosier \·. Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S.E. 
326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 174; Gardner v. 
Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40 S.E. 271; Schulen-
barger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 
843, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941; Watson v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 38 Wash. 662, 80 
P. 201 ; 2 Tiff any on Real Property ( 2d Ed.) 
Sec. 521. 
"A twenty-year use alone of a way is 
not sufficient to establish an easement. Here 
u.;e of a roadway opened by a landowner for 
Ins Oll'n 1mrpose will be presumed permissive. 
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way can-
n.ot sprin .r; from a permissive use. A prescrip-
tive title must be acquired adversely. It can-
not be adverse 1chen it rests upon a license 
or m~1·e neighborly accommodation. Adverse 
user is the antithesis of permissive user. If 
the use is accompanied by any recognition in 
express terms or by implication of a right in 
t~e Ia:idowner to stop such use now or at some 
b~11e m the future, the use is not adverse. 2 
Tiffany, supra, Sec. 519; Horne v. Hopper, 
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72 Colo. 434, 211 P. 665; Eddy v. Delllichelis 
100 Cal. App. 517, 280 P. :~89." (Emphasi~ 
ours) 
The case of Sdrales v. Rondos, 116 Utah 288, 
209 P2d 562 involves some prnperty on \Vest Tl'mp!e 
in Salt Lake City and an alleyway running behind 
the one tract upon which the owner of the next 
adjoining tract claimed a right by prescription. Th~ 
question which was of significance in that case was 
the means of application of the rules and presump-
tion relative to when a use is hostile or pennissiw. 
The court said, 
"[2] The defendant contends that ht 
has shown an open and continuous use of the 
alleyway by himself and his predecessors in 
title for over twenty years and that under the 
rule laid down by this court in Zollinger v. 
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 716, 
170 A.L.R., the use is presumed to be against 
the owner of the servient estate. True, in that 
case we said 'we think the better rule is that 
* * * where a claimant has shown an open and 
continuous use of the land for the prescrip-
tive period (20 years in Utah) the use will be 
presumed to have been against the owner and 
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the 
prescriptive easement from arising has t.hc 
burden of showing that the use was under h1!11 
instead of against him.' However, t~e _fart~ ll1 
Zollinger v. Frank are entirely <l1strnguish-
able from the facts in the present case. In tlw 
Zollinger case the servient owner did not opel 
the right of way for his own use and he usec 
only a portion of it infrequently. ~ecause ~~ 
these facts we distinguished the Zolhngrr ca~t 
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from Harkness \·. ·woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 
26 P. :Z~Jl. 29:~, wherein we said, 'Where a 
person opens a way for the use ~f his ow!1 pre-
mises, and another person uses it also without 
causing damage, the presumption is, in the 
absence of e\·iclence to the contrary, that such 
use bv the latter was permissive, and not 
under. a claim of right.' This rule was re-
affirmPd in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 
:39 P.2c1 1070. See the cases cited in support 
of the rule in 170 A.L.R. 825." 
In the case of Burkley 'V. Cox, supra, the plain-
tiff as the owner of a home in Provo, Utah had a 
clrireway on the north 12 feet of the property. The 
driveway was used as a means of ingress and egress 
to and from the rear of plaintiffs' property. The 
driveway had been constructed by Plaintiff's father 
some fifty years prior to the commencement of the 
action. No trouble existed between plaintiff and de-
fendant until app1·oximately three years prior to 
the commencement of the action. During this period 
rlefendant's son acquired an automobile and per-
sisted in parking it on the driveway in question. De-
fendant contended that the driveway was appur-
tenant to his prnperty; that his property line ex-
tended to the middle line of the driveway making a 
joint right of way. He further contended adverse 
use for more than twenty years. Under survey the 
description in defendant's deed revealed that his 
property line constituted the northern boundary of 
the driveway and did not extend to the middle of 
the clri\•eway. 
:! 1 
(Note: \Ve direct the court's attention to the 
fact that this is also true in the instant case. While 
the survey showed that the entire subdivision was 
laid out incorrectly from the starting point, 
the section corner as now established, if the suney 
was made from the stake used as the starting point 
originally, in setting the lines on the lots in question, 
the improvements are properly located, the county 
road is properly placed, and the travelled area of 
the driveway is on the defendant's property. (Ex. 
D-11)) It further shows that even originally when 
the tie bridge was built the boundary could not 
have been in the middle of the driveway.) (E:;, 
D-11) 
This Court, in the Buckley case, while admit-
ting that there was a conflict in the evidence point-
ed out, 
"A presil1nption well established in this state 
is that where a person opens a way for the 
use of his own preniises, and another pel'son 
also uses it without causing domage, in thf 
absence of evidence to the contrary, such use 
by the latter is permissive, and not under ci 
claim, of l'i,qht. Jensen v. Gerrard, supra; Sa~­
age v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P2d 111; 
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County 
Poultry Growers Ass'n.. Utah 209 P2rl: 
Sdrales v. Rondos, Utah, 209 P2d 562. It wa~ 
defendant's burden to overcome this presump-
tion and to establish this claim by clear and 
convincing evidence.Jen sen\'. Gerrard, supra. 
This, in the judgment of the lower coul't h' 
failed to do." (Emphasis ours) 
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The factual situation in the case of Lunt v. 
[{itche17s, 12:3 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 is close to 
the factual situation in the case before the court. 
l\'eidners opened a driveway upon their own pro-
perty next adjoining the land owned by the Kitchens. 
The vVeidners and the Kitchens, as adjoining neigh-
bors, lived in harmony and there were never any 
objectioHs raised to the use of the driveway on the 
Weiciner's property by the Kitchens for delivery of 
coal and \Voocl, fo1· access to parking of their cars 
and for foot passage. The W eidners sold to the 
Lunts. The Lunts objected to the use of the right 
of way by the Kitchens and shut it off. The law 
suit resulterl. In consideration of this case, the Su-
preme Court said, 
"However, it is obvious that where a 
special relationship such as a license exists, 
the owner of the land is entitled to more no-
tice than the mere use of his land not incon-
sistent with the license. Thus it is said in the 
Restatement of Property Sec. 458j; 
. 'vVhere a user of land and one having an 
m~erest affected by the use have a relation-
ship to each other sufficient in itself to justify 
the use, the use is not adverse unless knowl-
edge of its adverse character is had by the 
o~~ whose interest is affected. The responsi-
~1lity of bringing this knowledge to him lies 
m the one making the use.' 
" [ 5] In other words, the presumption 
of ~d\'ersity will not arise under mere use by 
a licensee and knowledge of such use on the 
part of the licensor. Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 
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Utah 361, 53 P. 1045. The 11sc m111wt be ,,d-
verse 1chen it rests upon license 01· mere 11cig/1• 
borly acc01n11wdation. Jensen v. Gerrarcl,·8.) 
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070. Sclrales v. Rondos 
116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562." ' 
* * * 
"The fact that, as witness for the respon-
dents testified, the driveway was used 'con-
stantly as ours [the Kitchenses]' is also in-
sufficient to give notice to a licensor of an ac!-
verse claim. The tearing down of a gate rrect-
ed by the Weidner's tenant, of course, would 
give actual notice of a claim of right, but this 
act did not occur until 1946." 
* * * 
"Where the use begins as permissive, as 
it does here under the presumption of Hark-
ness v. Woodmansee, supra, it is incumbent 
upon the party asserting that it has afterward 
become adverse to show at what point this oc-
curred in order to show a twenty-year hos-
tile period. "We are not justified in conjec-
turing as to when or if such a hostile period 
began.' Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 
P.2d 117, 124." (Emphasis ours) 
The recent case of Harriet Rippent'l'op v. Pick-
ering in 1962, 15 U. 259, 387 P.2d 95, again recog-
nizes the fact that neighborly accommodation be-
tween kinfolk cannot become the basis of an adnrs~ 
claim and the court stated, 
"For over half century the drive awear-
ed to have been used by adjoining owi:ers, ~II 
of whom claimed title to their respective P10; 
perties through a common grantor, and al1 °· 
whom, and their predecessors in ti tie, belong-
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erl to the same family, until 1959, when the 
north tract was sold to plaintiff, wh? broug~t 
this action. Before that date, there is no evi-
dence of anything but a cordial family use of 
the drive, as ordinarily W?uld be the case 
with kinfolk. Any presumpt10n as to adverse 
user for mm·e than 20 years seems clearly to 
have been dispelled by evidence of permissive, 
neighborly use. 
"The metes and bounds descriptions re-
flerted in the abstracts of title were not de-
troyed by procedure or proof in this case, but 
on the contrary the record supports the trial 
court's conclusion that any use of the subject 
drive, looking at the record favorably to ap-
pellant, was not adverse and consequently de-
fendant's record title remained inviolate. We 
think that after review thereof, we are con-
strained to and do hold that our pronounce-
ments in Lunt v. Kitchens and the authorities 
therein cited, pertinently and significantly are 
dispositive of this, a very similar case." 
That the law as laid down by the Supreme Court 
of Utah is also recognized as the law in other juris-
dictions is shown by the annotation appearing at 27 
ALR2d 332 on the subject, "Boundary Strip - Re-
ciprocal Use". Many authorities are there cited in 
support of the views expressed by this Court in the 
cases above cited. Particular attention is directed 
to the statement of the annotator found at page 354 
of the mentioned annotation: 
"If the driveway commenced simply in a use 
by on_e ?f the adjoining owners, or at most is 
not d1stmcly shown to have originated in con-
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current acti?~ by adjoining owners, n1ii· 
through prov1s10n made by anyone who at the 
time owned both properties, the finding that 
the user was not adverse may be well Sll]l-
ported." 
In the case of Rust v. Engledow, (Texas Ci\'. 
App.) 368 SW2d 635, the court said: 
'"Use of a right of way is permissive and not 
adverse, as a matter of law, if the way is alsu 
used by the owner of the land, along with 
the other user." 
We beUeve that the cases cited by defendants 
Struhs in support of their position are pertinent 
and controlling under the facts in this case. An an-
alysis of the cases cited by the plaintiffs in their 
brief discloses that almost without exception thesP 
cases are clearly distinguishable on a factual basis. 
They are cases wherein the adjoining property 
owners either by actual agreement, or in fact mu-
tually joined in the creation of a joint driveway. 
each contributing land and work in the establish-
ment of the driveway for their mutual or joint use. 
For this reason, the cases cited by the plaintiffs are 
not helpful in resolving the problems presented in 
the instant case, since no such factual situation 
was here proved. 
POINT III. 
THIS ACTION IS ONE AT LAW. TF THEl~E JS 
ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECOIW TO 
SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS THE JUDGJ\JE\T 
OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAI~F.fl 
This Court in the case of Buckley I', Cox. U~ 
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u. J:'il ~47 P2d 277 was there confronted with a 
wry similar case to the one n?w before the Court 
as shown by the court's analysis of the facts: 
"Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title 
in the driveway in herself and to enjoin the 
defendants from further use of such drive-
way Defendant contended that the driveway 
was appurtenant to his property and that the 
property line extended to the middle of the 
driveway making it a joint right of way. He 
further contends that by open, adverse, and 
hostile use under a claim of right for over a 
period of twenty years he had acquired a 
right by prescription over the strip of land 
in question." 247 P2d at page 278. 
The Court, after summarizing the facts as 
above quoted, then said, 
"Under the criteria set out in Norback v. 
Board of Directors 84 U. 506, 37 P2d 339, 
this action is one at law. Hence, if there is 
any competent evidence in the record to sup-
port the Court's findings the judgment should 
not be disturbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
76 U. 475, 290 P. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens, 
64 U. 307, 231 P. 112. This principle is well 
stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U. 841, 39 
P2d, 1070, 1072: 
'As this is a law action, the question is 
not whether the evidence would have sup-
ported the decision in favor of the appel-
lants, but whether the decision made by 
the trial court finds support in the evi-
dence. If there is competent credible evi-
dence to support the findings made by 
the trial court, then those findings should 
stand. * * * 
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"The evidence as revealed by the l'ecord is 
conflicting. It is sufficient to support a de<:i-
sion for either party. The trial judge saw and 
heard all the witnesses and viewrd the exhi-
bits. He found that the use by the defenclam 
was permissive and not adverse. Since compe-
tent evidence in the record supports the court's 
findings and judgment we may not distmb 
the latter." (at page 280 of 247 P2d.) 
We believe this language particularly applic-
able to the case at bar. Here the trial court not only 
heard the witnesses and examined the exhibits, bul 
took sufficient interest to actually visit the scene 
and examine the ground, and upon his retmn to 
the bench stated: 
"THE COURT : The record may show that I 
did inspect the properties involved herein. I 
paid particular attention to the culvert where 
it now exists and to trees that are on either 
side of the creek, both above and below the 
culvert, and I have observed the trees that 
are near the Struhs home. You may promd, 
Mr. Black". (R-86) 
After the careful consideration given by the 
trial court to the facts, testimony and exhibits, the 
trial court found that the use of the driveway in 
question by plaintiffs and plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest was not adverse but a "cm·dial family use 
of the drive as might be and is generally the case 
between kinfolk and good neighbors and was neigh-
borly accommodation." (R-32 Finding 27) 
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There is adequate evidence in the record to 
support thr court's findings and decree. Under the 
doctrine approved by this Court in the case above 
citPcl, the judgment in this case should not be dis-
turbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court below should be af-
firmed, and the defendants should be awarded their 
costs here incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOE P. BOSONE and 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
Suite 604 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
315 East 2nd South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
Merle R. Struhs and Jackie Struhs. 
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